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ABSTRACT 
We describe a more advanced authorisation infrastructure for 
identity management systems which in addition to the 
traditional Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) and Policy Decision 
Point (PDP) has an application independent policy enforcement 
point (AIPEP), a credential validation service (CVS) and a 
master PDP. The AIPEP is responsible for handling sticky 
policies, calling the master PDP, performing application 
independent obligations, and validating credentials using the 
CVS. The master PDP is responsible for calling multiple 
traditional PDPs that support a variety of policy languages, and 
resolving conflicts between the various authorisation decisions. 
Whilst this authorisation infrastructure may seem more complex 
to implement, it is in fact easier for applications to integrate 
since nearly all of the complexity is hidden beneath the PEP 
interface.   
Categories and Subject Descriptors 




Credential Validation Service, Master PDP, Application 
Independent PEP, Sticky Policy, PDP, PEP, Obligations Service 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Policy based access control systems are now well established. 
They rely on an application independent policy decision point 
(PDP) to make authorization decisions, and an application 
dependent policy enforcement point (PEP) to enforce these 
decisions. In a federated system we cannot assume that every 
service provider (SP) and every user will use the same policy 
language for specifying their rules Hence the same PDP cannot 
be used for evaluating all policies. This is because different 
policy languages support different rule sets and functionality; so 
it is not possible to construct every type of required policy using 
just one policy language. Today we have many examples of 
different policy languages e.g. XACMLv2 [1], XACML v3 [2], 
PERMIS [3], P3P [4], Keynote [5] etc. and hence many 
different PDP implementations.  If a user provides a sticky 
consent policy in a different language to that used by the SP’s 
access control policy, the SP will need an authorization 
infrastructure that is capable of evaluating multiple policies 
written in multiple languages. 
Obligations are actions that must be performed when a certain 
event occurs. When the event is an authorization decision, then 
the obligations are actions that must be performed either before, 
after or along with the enforcement of the authorization decision 
[8]. Many obligations will be application specific, but some may 
be application independent, for example, recording the 
authorization decision in a secure audit trail, or notifying the 
user that someone has been granted access to his personal data. 
Other obligations may be introduced to make up for deficiencies 
in the PDP’s policy language, e.g. [7] describes how obligations 
can be used to specify over-ride policies in the XACML 
language, whilst [8] says how obligations can be used to support 
state based decision making in stateless PDPs. Given that some 
obligations are naturally application independent, whilst others 
are extensions of the functionality of the PDP, then it would be 
beneficial to have these obligations enacted by an application 
independent component of the authorization infrastructure, 
thereby reducing the burden on the application developer. 
PDPs need to obtain their policies from somewhere. The 
XACMLv2 standard proposes a functional component called the 
Policy Administration Point (PAP) which is responsible for 
creating the policies and making them available to the PDP 
through some back channel prior to the PDP making its 
decisions. The back channel could be, for example, an API to an 
integrated database, or a communications link to an external 
repository. However, using a back channel and previously 
prepared policies is too static for some use cases. Consider the 
privacy protection of personal data, where a user’s privacy 
policy is stuck to her personal identifying information (PII) [18]. 
In this case the policy needs to be passed dynamically along 
with the decision request to the PDP.  
In attribute based access controls (ABAC), the PDP makes it 
decisions based on the attributes of the subject, requested action, 
resource object and environment. In the XACML model the 
attributes are provided by a Policy Information Point (PIP). 
Whilst a PEP can usually reliably obtain the attributes of the 
resource object and the user’s requested action, and in some 
cases those of the environment, validating the attributes of the 
subject (and in some cases those of the environment) requires 
considerably more effort. This suggests that there are different 
types of PIP. A subject’s attributes are most often transferred as 
credentials, digitally signed by the authoritative source(s) of the 
attributes. We thus need a type of PIP that is responsible for 
validating credentials, extracting the valid attributes from them 
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and discarding the rest. We propose a credential validation 
service (CVS) for this [9].  
Finally, in an identity management system that uses sticky 
policies, we need a way of securely transferring these policies 
between system components along with the data they are 
“stuck” to. Whilst we could leave this to each application to do 
in its own protocol specific way, we could also do this in an 
application protocol independent way thereby making it easier 
for applications to incorporate sticky policies into their systems 
[19]. We propose solutions for each of the above problems in 
our advanced authorization infrastructure. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
describes our advanced authorization infrastructure. Section 3 
concludes and describes our future plans. 
2. AN ADVANCED AUTHORISATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
2.1 The Application Independent PEP  
We introduce several new components into existing 
authorization infrastructures. Firstly we introduce an application 
independent policy enforcement point, the AIPEP. The AIPEP 
is responsible for coordinating the various actions of the 
application independent authorization infrastructure. It presents 
a single interface to the application dependent PEP, in order to 
make integration easy. To the PEP it appears to be a standard 
PDP. To the (Master) PDP, it appears to be a normal PEP. It is 
therefore a proxy for both. The interface that we are currently 
using for the PEP-AIPEP is the recently published OASIS draft 
standard [10]. This SAML profile allows an XACML formatted 
authorization decision request to be combined with the policy 
that is to be used by the PDP and both passed as a SAML query 
in a new element called an XACMLAuthzDecisionQuery. The 
SAML response allows an XACML response context, 
containing a response and optional obligations, to be returned in 
a newly defined SAML assertion, the 
XACMLAuthzDecisionStatementType. Other optional 
parameters can also be in the assertion, such as an altered 
request context which contains the set of attributes that were 
actually used in the authorization decision making. When the 
AIPEP receives the authorization decision query message (step 
1 in figure 1), it first calls the CVS to validate any credentials 
that are contained in the query message (step 2 in figure 1). We 
have specified how various types of unvalidated credentials 
such as SAML attribute assertions, X.509 public key certificates 
and X.509 attribute certificates can be passed to the AIPEP/PDP 
proxy in an Open Grid Forum profile [11] of [10]. 
2.2 The Credential Validation Service 
The CVS is described in detail in [9]. It is a specialized PIP that 
is configured with a credential validation policy which tells it 
which credentials are valid, in terms of who the trusted attribute 
authorities (AAs) are and which attributes each are trusted to 
issue to which groups of users. The protocol we use for 
communicating between the AIPEP and the CVS is based on 
WS-TRUST [12] and SAMLv2 [13] and the complete profile is 
specified as an Open Grid Forum profile [14]. The CVS can 
work in either pull mode, push mode or pull and push mode.  
Pull mode means that the requester does not have any 
credentials and requires the CVS to pull them itself from its 
configured trusted AAs, or a subset of them. The reason for 
adding the subset advisory field, is that in a large federation, 
such as the UK Access Management Federation, there could be 
several hundred trusted Identity Providers (IdPs) or AAs 
configured into the CVS’s validation policy, and in pull mode 
one would not want the CVS to ask each of these if it had any 
credentials for the subject in question. We have also specified an 
Open Grid Forum profile for the protocol to pull credentials 
[15], which is based on SAMLv2. Our CVS implementation 
however is more sophisticated than this, and can also pull X.509 
attribute certificates from an LDAP repository or WebDav 
server [16], LDAP string attributes from a trusted LDAP server, 
and follow delegation chains of credentials. Our CVS therefore 
contains a delegation policy that tells it which delegated 
credentials it can trust. There currently isn’t a standard policy 
language for a CVS policy, and in [9] we say why XACMLv2 is 

































































Figure 1. An Advanced Authorisation Infrastructure 
Push mode means that the WS-Trust request message contains 
the full set of credentials which are to be validated by the CVS, 
and none further need to be pulled. Note that the push/pull 
dialect field is advisory only, since the CVS is allowed to pull 
further credentials if it needs to. For example, if the AIPEP sent 
a delegated credential to be validated and the delegator is not a 
root of trust in the CVS’s policy, then the credentials of the 
delegator will need to be pulled. Pull and push mode, as its 
name implies, is requesting the CVS to validate the credentials 
in the request message and pull any further credentials that it 
can find for the subject of the authorization decision query. 
Again an advice field can specify a subset of the AAs/IdPs to 
pull from. Once the CVS has finished validating the subject’s 
credentials, these are returned to the AIPEP as XACML 
formatted attributes in step 5 of figure 1, ready to be passed to 
the Master PDP.  
2.3 The Master PDP 
In order to evaluate multiple policies in different languages we 
introduce a new conceptual component called the Master PDP. 
The Master PDP is responsible for calling the multiple 
configured policy language specific PDPs (step 7), obtaining 
their authorization decisions (step 8), and then resolving any 
conflicts between these decisions, before returning the overall 
authorization decision and any resulting obligations to the 
AIPEP (in step 9). The Master PDP is configured to know each 
policy language that each subordinate PDP supports, so that 
when it is passed a sticky policy it knows which PDP to give 
each component of the sticky policy to. Each of the policy PDPs 
supports the same interface, which is the SAMLv2 profile of 
XACMLv2 [10]. This allows the Master PDP to call any 
number of subordinate PDPs, each configured with its own 
policy in its own language. The Master PDP can also 
dynamically pass the policy that is to be used by each PDP at 
decision time.  One of a new breed of PDPs that is currently 
being built as part of the EC TAS3 project [6] is a behavioral 
trust engine which will return an authorization decision about 
whether the requester is trusted or not to perform the requested 
action on the specified resource. The policy language for 
specifying the behavioral trust rules is SWI-Prolog and is still 
being finalized, but the current design isolates this policy 
language from the rest of the authorization infrastructure, and 
the Master PDP will not be affected by any changes in this 
policy language as it evolves. The behavioral trust PDP will 
either be configured with its policy via a back channel, or 
dynamically with the policy that accompanies the authorization 
decision request message. 
2.4 Sticky Policy Contents 
We propose a StickyPAD which is a combination of a (set of) 
sticky policy(ies) and the data to which the policies apply. The 
stickyPAD is created by the authoritative source of the data 
(typically the IdP) digitally signing the package. It is the 
responsibility of the receiving PEP to validate the signature 
when it receives a StickyPAD message in step 0 of figure 1. The 
PEP will then parse and unpack valid StickyPAD messages and 
re-package the various elements in the standard format of [11] 
ready for passing to the AIPEP. 
Each embedded sticky policy in the StickyPAD is flagged with 
its policy language and its author. Various types of sticky policy  
may be defined: 
- authorization policies – these says who is authorized to 
perform which actions on the associated data/resource. 
Each authz policy has an author, so that it can be referred 
to by the conflict resolution policy. 
- conflict resolution policy – says how conflicts between the 
different authorization policy decisions are to be resolved 
and which authorisation decision and obligations should be 
returned to the AIPEP. It must be written by the issuer of 
the StickyPAD. 
- audit policies – say what information should be audited 
when the associated data/resource is accessed. 
- obligations policies – say what actions need to be 
undertaken by the receiving PEP when it initially receives 
the StickyPAD. 
- privacy policies – contain privacy specific rules such as 
retention periods and purposes of use. (Note. These may be 
combined in the authorization policies depending upon the 
specific authz policy language used, but not all 
authorization policy languages can support all privacy 
specific rules). 
- authentication policy – says what level of assurance (LoA) 
is required of requesting subjects who are to be allowed to 
access the associated data. (Whilst it is possible to 
represent LoAs in the authorization policy e.g. as described 
in [17], by keeping this as a separate policy it allows the 
PEP to short circuit the whole authorization process if the 
requesting subject has not been authenticated sufficiently.) 
- data manipulation policy – provides rules for how the 
associated data (usually PII) can be transformed, enriched 
or aggregated with other personal data of the same data 
subject or of other data subjects. 
2.5 Conflict Resolution Policy 
The Master PDP is statically configured with a Conflict 
Resolution Policy which covers access to its static resources. In 
addition it may be dynamically given a Conflict Resolution 
Policy taken from a sticky policy attached to dynamic data. The 
conflict resolution policy states how the decisions and 
obligations returned from the multiple subordinate PDPs are to 
be combined together to produce a single result. For example, if 
the dynamic data is the favorite drink PII attribute of a data 
subject, then the data subject would be the author of the sticky 
conflict resolution policy, whereas for a data subject’s criminal 
record the legal system would be the author of the sticky 
conflict resolution policy. For a static computing resource, the 
organization (resource owner) would be the author of the static 
conflict resolution policy. The Master PDP ensures that any 
resulting authorization decision conflicts are handled in 
accordance with the wishes of the author of the current conflict 
resolution policy. 
The XACML standard has a reasonably comprehensive section 
describing policy combining algorithms. XACMLv2 [1] defines 
the following policy combining rules:  
- Deny-overrides (both Ordered and Unordered) – A Deny 
result over-rides all other results, but otherwise the other 
results (Permit, Indeterminate and NotApplicable) may still 
be returned. 
- Permit-overrides (both Ordered and Unordered) – A Permit 
result over-rides all other results, but otherwise the other 
results (Deny, Indeterminate and NotApplicable) may still 
be returned. 
- First-applicable – After a policy has computed a Deny or 
Permit result, processing of all further policies stops and 
this first result is returned. 
- Only-one-applicable – If from the set of policies only one 
policy is applicable to the request, then the result of 
evaluating this is returned. If however, multiple policies are 
applicable then Indeterminate is returned. 
In addition, XACMLv3 [2] defines the Deny-unless-permit and 
Permit-unless-deny algorithms. The purpose of these is to 
ensure that an Indeterminate or NotApplicable result is never 
returned to the PEP by the PDP. 
We can use the XACML policy combining rules as the basis for 
the Master PDP’s conflict resolution policy. However, the above 
rule set does not have a rule that allows the Master PDP to 
preferentially choose the authorization policy of the 
authoritative source. We need an additional rule, specifically: 
- Identified Author’s policy overrides – this rule states that 
the authorization policy written by the identified author 
takes precedence over all other authorization policies. 
The conflict resolution policy may also contain sets of 
obligations that should be returned with either Deny or Permit 
results, in addition to those returned by the PDPs. 
2.6 Obligations Service 
Obligations may be required before the user’s action is 
performed, after the user’s action has been performed, or 
simultaneously with the performance of the user’s action [8]. 
We call this the temporal type of the obligation, which can be 
set to either before, with, or after. Examples are as follows: 
before the user is given access, increase the amount of logging 
to monitor what he is doing; after the user has been given 
access, record the amount of cpu that was used; simultaneously 
with the user’s access, decrement his account balance. As 
described in [8] the failure semantics of each are as follows: a 
before obligation will be enacted even if the user’s action 
subsequently fails, an after obligation may fail to be performed 
even if the user’s action succeeds, and a with obligation should 
only succeed if the user’s action succeeds, and should fail if the 
user’s action fails.  The presence of a with temporal type means 
that these obligations (at least) have to support two-phase 
commit, and be prepared to rollback their effects if the user’s 
action fails. If the user’s action succeeds then the with 
obligation can be told to commit to its actions. 
According to the XACML model, each obligation has a unique 
ID (a URI). The obligations service will know which obligations 
it can support, by being configured at construction time with the 
set of obligation IDs that are supported. When passed a set of 
obligations by the AIPEP, the obligations service will walk 
through this list and call the appropriate application independent 
obligation service. If any single obligation service returns an 
error, then the obligations service must stop further processing 
and return an error to the AIPEP. If all obligations are processed 
successfully, a success result can be returned. Each of the 
application independent obligation services must be of temporal 
type before, otherwise they cannot be enacted by the AIPEP.  
3. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PLANS 
The advanced authorization infrastructure described here is 
currently being constructed as part of the EC TAS³ project. We 
have already constructed the AIPEP, the obligations service and 
the CVS and integrated these with both the PERMIS and 
XACML PDPs using the protocols specified in [11], [14] and 
[15]. We have implemented state based Break The Glass 
policies using the AIPEP, obligations service and a stateless 
PDP. A live demo of BTG is available at http://issrg-testbed-
2.cs.kent.ac.uk/. Our next step is to implement the Master PDP 
and conflict resolution policy. We then plan to define an 
application independent protocol for carrying sticky policies 
between systems using the AIPEP instead of the PEP, as 
described in [19]. 
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